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ABSTRACT 
The object of this paper is an examination of section seven of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ('the Act'). A policy analysis along Natural Justice 
and Fairness lines will be applied to section seven. The rationale behind the analysis 
is the fact that this is a vital section of the Act as it provides the only official check on 
the Executive. This check is in relation to enacting legislation which is inconsistent 
with the Act. The section is an important part of New Zealand's primary human rights 
legislation and as such it should accord with ideals consonant with Natural Justice 
and Fairness principles. 
Through the application of this analysis and an examination of the rationale 
behind the analysis, this paper attempts to illustrate that there are some serious flaws 
inherent in section seven. These flaws include problems associated with a lack of 
transparency in the process and the risk of the appearance of bias. 
This paper argues that these flaws have significant potential consequences. 
These consequences include the further erosion of public faith in New Zealand's 
human rights framework, which incorporates Parliament and the Judiciary. In the 
current milieu faith in the system is at a critically low point. 
In light of the foregoing, this paper argues that radical refonn of section seven 
is required. This paper acknowledges that this is a difficult task. Several options for 
reform will be identified and their relative sb·engths and weaknesses will be assessed 
in order to find the most feasible option. A proposal for reforn1 is then presented by 
this paper. 
WORD COUNT The text of this paper (excluding Table of Contents, Absb·act, 
Bibliography and Foornotes) is approximately 14,466 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
'We look forward to a world founded on four essential human freedoms . The 
first is freedom of speech and expression ... The second is freedom of every 
person to worship God in his own way ... The third is freedom from want .. . The 
fourth is freedom from fear ' 
(Franklin D. Roosevelt 1882-1945, Message to the Congress, 6 January 1941, in Public 
Papers (1941) vol. 9, p672) 
Franklin Roosevelt's words reflect the international recognition given to ideals 
such as freedom, dignity and respect. New Zealand as a responsible citizen of the 
world community has a commitment to these ideals. This commitment is borne out in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ('the Act'). 
This year on the 150111 anniversary of the New Zealand Parliament, the Deputy 
Prime-Minister, the Hon Dr Michael Cullen gave a vigorous speech warning of the 
dangers of tolerating the emerging view that sovereignty is to be shared by the Courts 
and Parliament. In relation to the development of an entrenched supreme law for New 
Zealand, Hon Dr Michael Cullen decried New Zealand' s experience to date with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as inspiration for such a move. 1 
In light of this atmosphere, the time appears ripe for examination of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ('the Act') . This paper seeks to examine one crucial 
section of the Act. This is section seven which is commonly known as the 'Attorney -
General's vetting provision ' . It is a vital section because in the absence of a provision 
enabling the Courts to strike down legislation on the basis of inconsistency with the 
Act, it provides the only fonnal check on the Executive's power in relation to Bill of 
Rights compliance. 
In order to examine section seven a Natural Justice or Fairness policy analysis 
will be undertaken. 
The Natural Justice and Fairness analysis will focus primarily on transparency 
and appearance of bias issues. These issues will be considered because they have the 
1 (24 May 2004) 617 NZPD 13192 
2 
potential to adversely impact on public faith in New Zealand's human rights 
framework and to compromise the concept of impartiality of the Attorney-General, 
which is an important part of the Attorney-General's constitutional role. 
It is submitted that the policy analysis in this paper will highlight some major 
flaws in the section seven process. The first of these flaws is a lack of transparency in 
the two-tiered system which currently assesses Bill of Rights Compliance. This has 
the potential to affect public confidence in the process and is inappropriate in relation 
to an enactment which is rights-based. The second and most significant flaw is 
difficulties analogous to the Natural Justice principle of 'apparent bias'. The problem 
is that section seven, by its very nature, creates a 'manifest contradiction' in relation 
to the roles of the Attorney-General. This manifest contradiction seriously 
compromises the semblance of impartiality of the Attorney-General. 
The flaws that this paper highlights require a radical reform of section seven 
and its associated process. Why is such a reform needed? It is acknowledged that any 
cure must not be worse than the ill. However, the theme which runs through this paper 
is that the potential implications of these flaws are too important for a consideration of 
reform options not to be undertaken. 
It is argued that a suitable approach to the challenge of identifying an 
appropriate substitute scrutineer is to canvass several options. An assessment of the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the potential options may then be undertaken and 
a conclusion reached as to the most viable substitute entity. 
Before applying the policy analysis, the significance of the Act and section 
seven within its framework will be explored. 
II SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT I990-
AND SECTION SEVEN 
It is axiomatic that every person has certain inviolable rights in relation to 
freedom, dignity and respect. This has been recognised in a number of international 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. In fact, New 
Zealand is obliged to report every four years to the International Human Rights 
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Committee in relation to the rights set out in the international instrument known as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR).2 This instrument 
was ratified by New Zealand in 1978.3 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act ('the Act') was enacted in 1990. It is an 
unentrenched Act, which does not have the status of supreme law.4 In general, the Act 
contains international human rights norms relating to civil and political rights in line 
with the provisions contained in the ICCPR. The Act includes the right to 
freedom of expression, the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, the 
right not to be deprived of life and the right to freely practise one's beliefs and 
religion.5 The Act upholds a number of fundamental rights, which are essential to 
human rights and dignity. 
The Act's significance lies in its function as a compliance mechanism in terms 
of international human rights standards and to 'affirm, protect, and promote human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand' .6 
Given the vital nature of the Act, what is the importance of section seven 
within the Act? 
Section Seven of the Act provides; 
7. Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears to 
be inconsistent with Bill of Rights-
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the 
Attorney-General shall-
a) In the case of a Government Bill , on introduction of the 
Bill; or 
b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the 
introduction of the Bill, -
2 See; G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Power, New Zealand's Constitution and Government 
(Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2004) 323 
3 See; T McBride New Zealand Civil Rig/us Handbook ( Auckland, Legal Information Service Limited, 
2001) 8/ l. 
4 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s.4 
5 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, ss 14, 22, 23, 8, 13 
6 Pre-amble to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
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bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any 
provision in the Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of 
the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights. 
Standing Order 264 imposes a similar obligation on the Attorney-General to indicate 
that a provision of a Bill appears inconsistent with the Act and how it appears to be 
inconsistent. This must be done before a motion for the Bill's first reading is moved. 
Standing Order 264 also states that the relevant indication is to be made by 
presentation of a paper for publication by order of the House. 
Section seven is an integral part of the human rights and freedoms legislative 
framework established by the Act. The significance of section seven lies in the fact 
that by necessity it focuses the Government's attention on rights contained in the Act. 
As the Rt Hon. Sir Geoffrey Palmer stated on the introduction of the Act to the 
House; 
'The significance of the Attorney-General's reporting requirement is that it will 
necessitate a careful examination of all Government Bills before introduction in light of the 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights .... The possibility of an adverse report by the Attorney-
General will, I think, have a salutary effect on those involved in the legislative process. It will 
send a clear message that legislative proposals must be consistent with those basic principles 
before a bill is introduced. ' 7 
The prophecy referred to above appears to have come to fruition. It has been 
clearly recognised that the threat of an adverse section seven report has indeed 
ensured that Departments are mindful of Bill of Rights concerns in policy formulation 
and legislative drafting. The section has successfully provided a legislative 
mechanism aimed at keeping Parliamentarians in line with the ideals espoused in the 
Act.8 It has also given formal recognition to the place of the Act in the process of 
policy development by Government.9 
7 
( I O October 1989) NZPD (1989) vol.502, 13039 
8 Mr David McGee, Clerk of the House of Representatives commented to the writer in an interview on 
22"d July 2004, at Parliament, that a great deal of work happens behind the scenes between the Ministry 
of Justice and other Departments in terms of compliance. The threat of an adverse Bill of Rights report 
keeps Ministers and Departments in line. Mr McGee also stated that only where there are strong 
political imperatives should the Government go against an adverse Bill of Right report. See also; A 
Butler, "Strengthening the Bill of Rights" (2000) 31 VUWLR, 129, 145. 
9 P Rishworth, G I Iuscroft, S Optican, R Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Melbourne, 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 196 
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III NATURAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS POLICY ANALYSIS 
This paper seeks to apply a policy analysis of section seven analogous to the 
principles contained within Natural Justice and legal ideas of Fairness. Analysis along 
policy lines is appropriate as it is acknowledged that the legal principles of Natural 
Justice do not strictly apply to the section seven process. This is because Natural 
Justice applies to specific rights of ascertained individuals (often in a disciplinary 
context) whereas the exercise of section seven potentially covers non-specific rights 
of the wider general public. 10 The learned Judges in Re Royal Commission on Thomas 
Case11 stated those having an interest in common with the public are an exception to 
the Natural Justice idea that interested persons are 'afforded a fair opportunity of 
presenting their representations and meeting prejudicial matters ' .12 
1. RATIONALE BEHIND ANALYSIS 
Despite the fact that Natural Justice does not apply to section seven in strict legal 
terms, an analysis using principles consonant with Natural Justice and fairness is still 
a valuable exercise. From a policy perspective, it is necessary to determine whether a 
key section and process in an Act, which espouses a commitment to human rights and 
freedoms, accords with accepted ideals of fairness and Natural justice. If New 
Zealand is to be seen as taking its commitment to fundamental human rights norms 
seriously, the Act must withstand scrutiny on the analysis referred to above. The 
aspects which the policy analysis will focus on include; 
a) Independence issues. 
b) Principles relating to the appearance of bias. 
c) Transparency issues. 
2. NATURAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS 
Why is Natural Justice an appropriate analysis model despite the fact it does not 
strictly apply to the operation of section seven? This question can be answered by 
examining the nature of Natural Justice. Furnell v Whangarei High Schools 
10 See; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s27 (I ) and PA Joseph, Constitllfional and Administrative 
Law in New Zealand (Wellington , Brookers, 200 I) Ch 23. 
11 Re Royal Commission on Thomas Case [ 1982] I ZLR 252 (CA) 
12 PA Joseph , Constitwional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Wellington, Brookers, 200 I) 
258. The learned judges referred to Re Royal Commission on State Services [ 1962] NZLR 96, 117; Re 
£rebus Royal Commission ( No. 2) [ 1981 J I NZLR 61 8 
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Board13described Natural Justice as 'but fairness writ large and juridicially' .14 In 
broad terms the rules of Natural Justice or 'Fairness' (which may be used as an 
alternative term for Natural Justice) 15 have been said to apply whenever the rights, 
property, or legitimate expectations of an individual are affected. 16 Being a creature of 
the Common Law, the rules of Natural Justice are flexible and capable of adapting to 
a variety of different factual circumstances. 17 More specifically, Natural Justice may 
be described as a set of procedural rules which govern decision-making bodies. 18 The 
ideal behind the rules of Natural Justice is that when the power of decision -making is 
exercised in a way that has the potential to adversely affect an individual, that power 
should be exercised fairly. A decision-maker must therefore act in 'good faith and 
listen to both sides'. 19 
Section seven can be viewed as the exercising of a power which has the potential 
to adversely impinge on people's rights. This is because the Attorney-General may 
decide whether or not a Bill contains provisions which are inconsistent with the Act. 
If he or she decides as a matter of opinion (for the decision is inevitably based on the 
opinion of the Attorney-General) that a report is required this may stall a piece of 
legislation which limits individual rights. This may mean that there is a 
reconsideration by the House of the offending provision. Conversely, if the Attorney-
General is of the opinion that no report is warranted then the green light is given to a 
piece of legislation that others may argue restricts certain personal rights or freedoms. 
So whilst wider public rights (rather than the rights of specific individuals) and the 
performing of an obligation (rather than the strict exercising of a power) are involved, 
an analogy may be drawn with situations where Natural Justice would apply. 
13 Fumell v Whangarei High Schools Board [ 1973] 2NZLR 705 at 718 (PC) quoted with approval in 
Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [ 1980] 2NZLR 130 at 141 per Cooke J, cited in PA Joseph, 848 
14 PA Joseph, above n 
15 Dagnanayasi v Minister of Immigration [ 1980] 2NZLR 130, 141 (citing English authorities) cited in 
PA Joseph, above n 12, 848 
16 GA Flick, Natural Justice -Principles and Practical Application (Sydney, Butterworths, 1984) 26 
17 GA Flick, above n 16, 26 
18 See generally; PA Joseph, above n 12 Chapter 23 
19 Board of Education v Rice [ 1911 J AC 179 at 182 per Lord Loreburn (HL) quoted in PA Joseph, 
above n 12, 847 
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The rules of Natural Justice or fairness incorporate a number of different 
principles. This paper will only focus on those principles which are relevant to the 
analysis. 
The first relevant major tenet of Natural Justice is 'nemo judex in sua causa' 
which is the idea that no person may be judge in his or her own cause. This relates to 
the Natural Justice principle that Justice should be seen to be done.20 
A) The Rule Against Bias 
This rule falls under the umbrella of nemo judex in causa sua. Professor P Joseph 
states this rule demands 'general impartiality in decision-making ... for maintaining 
public confidence in the administration of justice' .21 Bias can take the form of actual, 
apparent or presumptive bias. Presumptive bias covers situations where the decision-
maker has a personal or financial interest in the outcome of the decision.22 Apparent 
bias deals with situations where the decision-maker has some relationship to a party 
or witness or some prejudice against, preference for or pre-determination relating to a 
particular outcome.23 The rules relating to bias are flexible and there are varying legal 
tests depending on the type of bias alleged.24 Apparent bias in the form of pre-
determination or pre-judgment is the most relevant type of bias potentially applicable 
to section seven and as such will be discussed below. The rule here is that a decision-
maker may be disqualified from participating in decision-making if he or she has pre-
judged the merits of a particular issue.25 It was stated in Re Royal Commission on 
1homas26 that in relation to predetermination, bias will be judged by outward 
appearance. 
20 PA Joseph, above n 12, 874 
21 PA Joseph, above nl2, 874 
22 PA Joseph, above n 12, 875 
23 PA Joseph, above nl2, 875 
24 See genera II y: PA Joseph, above n 12, chapter 23 
25 GA Flick, above nl6, 158 
26 Re Royal Commission on Thomas [ l 982) NZLR 252, 258 (CA) 
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In New Zealand the Courts have followed the approach of Lord Goff of Chieveley 
in R v Gough21. Lord Goff's test for the appearance of bias is whether there was a real 
danger of bias on the part of the decision-maker.28 
B) The importance of the rule against the Appearance of Bias 
A main focus of the analysis in this paper is apparent bias. It axiomatic that the 
Attorney -General carries out his or her function with the appropriate impartiality. 
This paper does not argue that the Attorney-General in reality is anything other than 
non-partisan. However, one of the major flaws in the section seven process is that it is 
open to criticism on the basis of an appearance of bias. It is submitted that this is 
unacceptable. 
Why is the appearance of bias unacceptable? This question may be answered by 
looking at the rationale behind the rule against apparent bias. A useful starting point is 
the classic formulation of principle by Lord Hewart CJ: 
'a long line of cases show that it is not merely of some importance but it is of fundamental 
importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to 
be done' .29 
In the case quoted above, at a hearing the acting Clerk of Court was a member of 
the Jaw firm representing the party suing the applicant in related civil proceedings. 
The Clerk retired with the Justices at the conclusion of the hearing of the evidence. 
The applicant was convicted. Subsequently, the applicant's solicitor objected to the 
Clerk having been present when the Justices were deliberating. Lord Hewart 
characterised the issue before the Court as not being whether the Clerk had in fact 
made inappropriate observations or comments during the Justices' deliberations but 
whether the Clerk was so related to the case in its civil proceedings that he was not fit 
to carry out his duties as Clerk to the Justices in the relevant criminal proceedings. 
27 R v Gough [ 1993] AC 646 at 670 followed in Auckland Casino Control Authority f 1995] NZLR 142 
(CA) 
28 Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino Control Awhority (1995] NZLR 142, 149 (CJ\) per Cooke P 29 R v Sussex Justices exp McCarthy [ 1924] I KB 256,259 
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Lord Hewart stated that the issue could be decided not on the basis of what was 
actually done but what might appear to have been done. 30 
The crucial part of Lord Hewart' s judgment for the purposes of the analysis in this 
paper is the statement that nothing should be done that creates even a suspicion that 
there has been an interference with the course of justice. Here the Court saw the Clerk 
as being in an untenable position by virtue of his dual roles. His dual role (as Clerk 
and counsel associated with related proceedings) was a 'manifest contradiction'. In 
these circumstances the Court quashed the applicant's conviction. 31 
The question then becomes why, in Lord Hewart's words, should justice 
manifestly be seen to be done? The House of Lords judgment in the infamous 
Pinochet (No.2) 32 deals with this issue. The House of Lords reiterates with approval 
Lord Hewart CJ's principle that justice must be seen to be done. 33 In Pinochet (No.2) 
the House of Lord's in the special circumstances of that case found presumptive bias 
as the basis for Lord Hoffman's disqualification. Some academics have suggested that 
this is due to the fact that the House of Lords found it distasteful to have to delve into 
the test for apparent bias (i.e. whether there was a real danger that Lord Hoff man was 
biased.)34 Nevertheless, some of the comments made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
regarding the rationale behind the rule against bias might equally apply to apparent 
bias. The focus of the rule was the need to maintain the concept of impartiality of the 
Judiciary. 35 The current Attorney General, the Honourable Margaret Wilson, has in 
fact, herself, emphasised the importance of avoiding apparent bias. The Attorney-
General commented; 
'It is the responsibility of the Attorney-General to uphold the rule of law. That includes 
maintaining confidence in the courts that hear cases by an independent and unbiased judiciary. 
Even the perception of bias can be damaging. ' 36 
30 R v Sussex Justices, above 1129, 259 
3 1 R v Sussex Justices, above n29, 259 
32 R v Bow Street Magistrates, Exp Pinochet ( No.2) [2000] I AC 119 (HL) 
33 R v Bow Street Magistrates, above n 32, I 29 and 135 
34 PA Joseph, above nl2, 23.5.2 (2) 
35 R "Bow Street Magistrates, above n32, 135 
36 Hon Margaret Wilson "Court action follows the rule of law" (2 September 2004) Media release 
available at http//: www.beehive.govt.nz (last accessed 28 September 2004). These comments were 
10 
From the above, we can derive the principle that the semblance of bias, in 
whatever form, may undermine the concept of impartiality. This has potentially 
serious consequences as the concept of impartiality is not only of constitutional 
importance to the role of the Judiciary, but also to the role of the Attorney-General. In 
light of this, an analysis based on an analogy with the concept of apparent bias will be 
undertaken below in relation to section seven of the Act. 
C) Duty To Provide Reasons 
Generally, there is no strict duty on a decision-maker to provide reasons for their 
decisions. 37 However, in the area of Natural Justice, it has been recognised that it is 
prudent for decision-makers to provide reasons. This is because a failure to provide 
reasons for a decision may lead to an inference that a decision lacks foundation and is 
arbitrary. 38 It has been hinted that it may be 'unfair' to not provide reasons. 39 So, 
whilst not strictly recognised by common law, there is a growing acceptance that 
providing reasons for a decision accords with ideals of Fairness. Again this principle, 
by analogy may be applied to the operation of section seven. 
3. SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS 
PRINCIPLES 
Natural Justice, as outlined above, is a fundamental part of the human rights 
matrix. It is specifically recognised by s27 of the Act, as such it would be illogical 
that any decision-making powers under the Act itself did not stand up to scrutiny on a 
Natural Justice analysis. This is true even if the doctrine does not apply in a strict 
legal sense. 
made in relation to the Government's decision to instigate judicial review proceedings of Judge 
Wickliffe's refusal to adjourn Maori East Coast claims on the foreshore and Seabed. 
37 NZ! Financial Corp Ltd v NZ! Kiwifruit Allthority [ 1986] NZLR 159 cited in PA Joseph, above nl2 
87 I. See also; Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [ I 971] 2 QB 175; [ I 971] I All ER 1148 cited 
by Barker J in T Flexman Ltd v Franklin Co!lnty Council [ 1979) 2 ZLR 690, 698 
38 NZ! Fishing lndllsfly Assn Inc v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [ 1988) NZLR 544 at 554 (CA) 
cited in PA Joseph, above n 12 872 
39 T Flexman Ltd v Franklin County Council [ 1979) 2NZLR 690 at 698-99 cited in GA Flick, above 
nl6, 127 
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If one breaks down the relevant aspects of Natural Justice referred to above 
several themes become apparent. These themes may be utilised to analyse section 
seven; 
a) The rule against bias suggests that it is vital for a decision-
maker to have the appearance of independence or the 
appearance of a Jack of bias in exercising that function. 
b) The arguments relating to the duty to provide reasons 
suggests a broader theme of the necessity for transparency in 
order to satisfy the requirements of Fairness. 
Analysis of section seven and the process associated with it will be undertaken 
below in relation to the two themes above. More particularly, the role of the Attorney 
General and his or her advisors and the recent operation of the section seven process 
will be assessed in light of these themes and a conclusion drawn. 
IV ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND HIS/HER AD VISORS 
At the heart of difficulties inherent in the section seven process are the two 
conflicting roles placed on the Attorney-General under the section which are 
irreconcilable with each other. As emphasised above it is the appearance of bias rather 
than the reality of the situation which is crucial to the concept of impartiality. An 
appearance of bias or appearance of a lack of independence as a scrutinising body is a 
major flaw in the process. These difficulties stem from the nature of the office of the 
Attorney-General and the demand placed on it by section seven. This can be 
illustrated with reference to the recent operation of the section seven process. An 
assessment of the recent operation of the section seven process will encompass 
examination of the Ministry of Justice website experiment and the Foreshore and 
Seabed Bill. These issues all raise significant concerns when the analysis is applied to 
them. 
1. THE OFFICE 
12 
The office of the Attorney-General was one of the institutions New Zealand 
adopted when we inherited the Westminster model of government.40 After the dawn 
of responsible government in New Zealand in 1865, the office of the Attorney-
General became a political appointment with the portfolio being held by a member of 
either House of the General Assembly.41 However, under the Attorney-Generals Act 
(NZ) 1866, the office was transformed into a non-political appointment. 42 The 
situation changed again in 1876 when the Attorney-Generals Act (NZ) 1876 provided 
that the office could be political or non-political. This meant that the Attorney-
General could be a member of the Executive Council but was not required to be so. 
Similarly, the Attorney-General had the option of elected membership of the 
Legislative Assembly but this was not mandatory. 43 According to Professor J 
Edwards, the office reverted to its original prerogative character in 1920.44 
Today the convention has emerged that the Attorney-General is always a Member 
of Parliament and usually a member of the Cabinet holding other portfolios.45 This is 
in stark contrast to the United Kingdom where the practice is clearly not to accord the 
Attorney-General with membership of the Cabinet.46 In terms of the New Zealand 
experience, strong arguments have been made for the inclusion of the Attorney-
General in Cabinet. For example the Attorney-Genera] can explain the impact and 
implications of judicial decisions to colleagues.47 Comments made by the former 
Attorney-General, Paul East reflect the idea that the Attorney-General's obligations 
include upholding the Constitution and ensuring that the Government acts lawfully.48 
Arguably, these goals can be most successfully achieved from within the ranks of 
40 PA Joseph ed., Essays on the Constitwion, The Honourable Paul East, Attorney-General, "The Role 
of the Attorney-General" (Wellington , Brookers, 1995), 185 
41 (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, vol.23 pp.20-22, October 4 1876) cited 
in JU Edwards, The Attorney-General, Politics and the Public Interest (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 
1984), 389 
42 JU Edwards, The Attorney-General, Politics and the Public Interest (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 
1984), 390 
43 Prof. Edwards, above n42, 390 
44 Prof. Edward, above n42, 390 
45 PA Joseph ed, Rt Hon. Paul East, above 1140, 185 
46 Eagleson WC, The Attorney-General and the public interest: Political independence -Reality or 
Myth ? (LLM thesis, 1998, Victoria University of Wellington), 9 
47 See: Sir Geoffrey Palmer, "The Role of the Attorney-General in Modem Government" Counsel 
Brief, October 1986, 6 
48 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Prof. M Palmer, above n2, 203 
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Cabinet, which has been described as the 'powerhouse of New Zealand 
government' .49 
So then, what is the role of the Attorney-General? He or she is the chief legal 
officer of the Crown. Further, the Attorney-General has been described as the 
'guardian of the public interest generally' .50 The role of the Attorney-General is 
vested with certain statutory and prerogative functions in the administration of 
Justice. 51 The role of the Attorney-General also includes, inter alia, acting as a 
channel of communication between the Government and Judiciary, making 
recommendations in relation to appointment of High Court and Court of Appeal 
Judges, and bringing proceedings in matters which affect the public interest.52 
In light of the above, especially the Attorney-General's role as 'guardian of the 
public interest', it is clear that a degree of independence is required. 53 However, it has 
been argued that it is difficult to find any clear legal ground for asserting the 
Attorney-General's right to act independently of his or her colleagues. This is argued 
on the basis that the Attorney-General shares in collective responsibility and is 
responsible to the Crown for the advice it provides the Crown and its servants.54 
Philosophical difficulty arises in relation to reconciling the potentially conflicting 
roles of protector of the public interest and active member of the Cabinet of the day. 
Essentially, the role is supposed to be apolitical or non-partisan despite the political 
pressures placed on the Attorney-General by virtue of his or her alternate role as a 
Cabinet Minister holding other portfolios. It is submitted that in New Zealand, despite 
the aforementioned arguments, the Attorney-General's office retains its air of 
independence today. However, difficulty arises where the Attorney-General is 
required to exercise a function which has serious political implications. This is at the 
very heart of the difficulties innate in section seven which will be discussed below. 
49 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Prof. M Palmer, above n2, 78 
50 Prof. JL Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown, (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1964) 286 
51 The Laws of New Zealand- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, para 170, <http//: www.butterworths.com 
(last accessed 17 June 2004) 
52 M Chen and Sir G Palmer Public Law in New Zealalld, Cases, Materials, Commentary alld 
Questions (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1993) 15 
53 PA Joseph, above n 12, 203 
54 Sir William Anson, The Law and Custom of the Collstitwion (41" ed.) vol.ii, pt 1, pp221-2 cited in G 
Marshall Constitwional Conventiolls: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability (Oxford, 
Oxford University Pres , 1984) I 12 
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2. APPLICATION OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS ANALYSIS 
In order to analyse the Attorney-General's role under section seven we must 
return to Lord Hewart CJ's words. Justice must always be seen to be done. This is 
fundamental to the maintenance of impartiality and the semblance of it. 55 The 
semblance of impartiality, as well as the reality of impartiality, is important for 
ensuring public faith in the system itself. It is posited that by its very nature section 
seven creates conflicting duties or roles for the Attorney-General which undermine 
the semblance of impartiality. These roles are completely irreconcilable. On the one 
hand the Attorney-General is required to carry out the role of impartial scrutineer in 
his or her capacity as non-partisan law officer of the Crown. On the other hand, the 
role of scrutineer inevitably involves scrutiny of the Government's own legislation. 
This is the legislation of a Government in which the Attorney-General is a member of 
the Cabinet. Further, the scrutiny involves aspects of political analysis. So then the 
section seven process is perhaps analogous to the position of the Clerk in R v Sussex 
Justices exp McCarthy. 56 In that case the issue was not what the Clerk did in reality, 
rather the position he was in by virtue of his dual role . The two-fold role created an 
untenable situation. In relation to the Attorney-General's dual role as Cabinet Minister 
and non-partisan law officer of the Crown, under section seven a position similar to 
the appearance of bias dealt with in R v Sussex Justices57 presents itself. 
Difficulty arises from the fact that sometimes Bill of Rights issues sunounding a 
nascent piece of legislation will be controversial. Section seven essentially enables the 
Attorney-General to give the green light to legislation, which is opposed by others on 
the basis of prima facie breach of the Act. Whatever the reality may be, there is a real 
danger that an Attorney-General performing this obligation could be viewed as having 
a pre-disposition to favour a view which supports the Government's political and 
legislative agenda. This potentially compromises the semblance of impartiality 
attached to the office of Attorney-General. 
55 R v Sussex Justices, exp. McCarthy [ 19241 l KB 256, at 259 per Lord Hcwart CJ 
56 R v Sussex Justices, exp above 11 29 
51 R v Sussex Justices exp above n29 
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More than the appearance of bias created by the dual role, which raises suspicions 
of pre-disposition, is the fact that scrutiny under section seven often requires a 
political analysis rather than a legal analysis. This will be examined in relation to the 
Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2003. This issue in effect means that the lines between 
politician and impartial legal officer become blurred under section seven. Given the 
implications of apparent bias, this is wholly inappropriate. 
3. RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL 
Before examining the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2003, analysis of the relationship 
between the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General must be undertaken. This 
legal officer is the deputy or junior officer subordinate to the Attorney-General.58 
Section 9 A of the Constitution Act 1986 states that the Solicitor-General may carry 
out any function of or duty imposed or power conferred on the Attorney-General. The 
important distinction between the two roles is that the Solicitor-General is not a 
Member of Parliament. Prof JL Edwards has stated that normally the Solicitor-
General is seen as the final decision maker in legal matters relating to the Crown. 
However, this practice does not and cannot distort the constitutional relationship 
between the Law Officers of the Crown where the Attorney-General holds the senior 
· · f 59 pos1t1on o power. 
The position of the Attorney-General at the top of the Government's legal 
hierarchy in effect means that in the end the opinion of the Attorney-General will 
prevail where there is disagreement amongst legal officers of the Crown. In relation to 
section seven this in effect means that the Attorney-General is not bound by the 
advice provided by his or her advisors just as Ministers are not bound by the advice of 
their officials. In the event that there is a difference of opinion between the Attorney-
General and Solicitor-General over a particular issue the Attorney General, as senior 
law officer, prevails. Under the status quo there is no transparency surrounding the 
process. ln effect the public and interested parties will never know when there has 
been a clash of opinions. 
58 Wilkes v R ( 1770) Wilm 322 at 329 and 330: 97 ER 123 at 126 cited in 'The Laws of New Zealand' 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (8) THE CROW , para 169, < http://www. butterworthsonline.com >(last 
accessed 18 June 2004) 
59 Professor JL Edwards, above n42, 393 
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The relationship between Solicitor General and Attorney-General raises issues 
concerning transparency. Also of significance is the fact that the Solicitor-General is 
part of a wider legal network of advice and support for the Attorney-General. The 
Ministry of Justice and the Crown Law Office provide advice to the Attorney-General 
on Bill of Rights scrutiny issues. In fact these advisors draft the Attorney-General's 
report. 60 Therefore, there is a potentially two-tiered system in place where in reality 
the scrutinising function is largely delegated to the Ministry of Justice and Crown 
Law officials.61 These facts are relevant to the reform options posited in this paper. 
V RECENT OPERATION OF THE SECTION SEVEN PROCESS 
An examination of the recent operation of the section seven process is useful to 
illustrate the flaws highlighted by a Natural Justice analysis. These relate to both 
transparency and appearance of bias concerns. 
1. WEBSITE OPERATION 
Examination of the Ministry of Justice's website raises a number of concerns 
relating to transparency. The operation of the section seven process has certainly 
increased in transparency in the last year. In February 2003, the Hon Margaret Wilson 
issued a media release advising that certain Bill of Rights legal advice would be made 
available on the Ministry of Justice's website once a Bill had been read in the House a 
first time and referred to Select committee. The rationale behind this change in policy 
was that Select Committees were receiving submissions from lawyers and lobby 
groups which raise Bill of Rights issues and without the Attorney-General's legal 
advice before them, they are not always in a position to properly evaluate these 
submissions.62 The publication of advice extends only to advice given from 1 January 
2003. Pre-January 2003 advice can only be obtained by an application under the 
Official Infonnation Act 1982 ('the OIA').
63 It is also significant to note that advice 
or (parts of advice) that could be withheld from release under the OJA will also be 
6° For example, a draft section seven report is stated to be attached to the advice to the Attorney 
General on the Taxation (Annual Rates, GST, Trans Tasman Imputation and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Bill 2003 available at <http//: www.justice.govt.co.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2004) 
61 See: P Rishworth and others, above n9 , 215 
62 Hon Margaret Wilson, "Minister goes public on Bill of Rights vets" ( 18 February 2003), published at 
<htt ://www. Beehive.govt.nz> (last accessed 30 July 2004) 
63 See: Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Prof. M Palmer, above n2, 325 
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withheld from the Ministry of Justice website.64 Recent section seven reports are 
available on the website too and reports made between 1999 and 2002 are available 
on the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives official website. 
The fact that transparency has increased is clearly a positive thing. However, there 
are some significant limits on this and problems which become apparent. The limit on 
advice prior to January 2003 in effect means that a great deal of advice still remains 
far from public view. The reasons given for not publishing pre-January 2003 advice 
were that it was too difficult to locate, check and format. 65 With respect, the 
importance of Bill of Rights advice for those working in areas affected by Bill of 
Rights concerns and the wider public interest in Bill of Rights issues requires that this 
stance be reconsidered. 
Examination of the published Bill of Rights advice and reports raises further 
issues of transparency. On the official website there are only two reports made by the 
Attorney-General for the year 2003.66 There are 50 Bills (not including the two 
reported on by the Attorney-General) for which advice is published on the website. 
There are two examples of pieces of advice where the legal advisers to the Attorney-
General have concluded that a provision in a Bill is inconsistent with the Act and this 
is unjustified. These pieces of advice urge the Attorney-General to table a section 
seven report in the House.67 No corresponding reports appear on the website. To 
members of the public it is unclear whether the Attorney-General has disregarded this 
advice and chosen not to make a section seven report or whether she has made a 
report and it is simply not published on the website. This has serious implications for 
transparency and public access to Bill of Rights issues. It must be noted that a 
Ministry of Justice official referred the writer to specific areas of the Clerk's and 
Ministry of Justice's website where the relevant reports could be located. The official 
64 
Hon Margaret Wilson, above n62 
65 Joanna Gould, Public Law Group at the Ministry of Justice, "Joanna.gould@justice.govt.nz", to the 
author" BORA advice publication" (30 July 2004) email. 
66 Report of the Attorney-General under the Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Care of Children Bill and 
Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 011 the Parole ( Extended 
S11pervisio11) and Sentencing Amendment Bill available at< http//: www.ju tice.govt.nz/bill-of-rights>, 
(last accessed 16 June 2004) 
67 
See: Advice on Taxation (Annual Rates. GST, Tra11s-Tas111an /mplllation and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Bill and Advice on Social Sec11rity ( Long Term Residential Care) Amendment Bill available 
at< http//: www.justicc.eovt.nz/bill-of-rights >(last accessed 16 June 2004) 
18 
acknowledged that the fact the writer had difficulty locating these reports was a 
concern which the Ministry hoped would be addressed in the upcoming review of the 
internet publication of advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of 
Bills with the New Zealand Bill of Rights act 1990.68 
The transparency concerns highlighted above are symptomatic of more serious 
flaws in the section seven process as a whole which must be addressed. 
2. FORESHORE AND SEABED BILL 
This section will examine the section seven report tabled by the Attorney-General 
in respect of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill. Examination of this report is pertinent 
because it raises a number of issues in relation to the appearance of independence of 
the Attorney-General and the difficulty of reconciling the incompatible roles of non-
partisan guardian of the public interest and member of the Cabinet which by necessity 
overlap under section seven. The reason why these roles overlap under the section 
will be assessed by analysing the Attorney-General's report on the Foreshore and 
Seabed B ii I. 
The Foreshore and Seabed Bill is the most controversial piece of legislation on the 
legislative agenda in recent years. The specific details and legal and political issues 
surrounding the Bill are outside the scope of this paper. However, some background 
will be provided to place the issues in context. The Bill was a direct response to the 
Court of Appeal's decision in Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3NZLR 643 
(CA)('Ngati-Apa case'). This was an appeal following the High Court decision which 
in effect upheld the Re Ninety Mile Beach decision69 that the seabed below the low 
watermark was vested in the Crown under certain legislation and the Maori Land 
Court had jurisdiction to investigate title to the foreshore but Maori Customary rights 
were extinguished wherever a Crown purchase or Maori Land Court order described 
the sea as boundary. A number of questions were placed before the Court of Appeal 
for consideration. 70 The Court of Appeal in effect overruled the Re the Ninety Mile 
68 Joanna Gould, above n65 
69 Re Nin ety Mile Beach [ 1963] NZLR 461 
70 See generally; T Bennion, "The claim of the Crown is weak" Maori LR May 2003. 
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Beach decision and held, inter alia, that the Maori Land Court had full jurisdiction to 
determine the status of the foreshore and seabed.71 
The stated purpose of the Bill was to clarify the status of the foreshore and seabed 
m light of the Ngati-Apa case and to provide for recognition and protection of 
customary rights and interests in the public foreshore and seabed.72 The practical 
impact of the Bill is to remove the ability of Maori to test any claim they may have to 
the foreshore or seabed at Common Law in the Maori Land Court. Many people feel 
that this is a 'confiscation' of Maori rights to have their 'day in Court' which is a right 
guaranteed to all citizens under the Rule of Law.73 Ngai Tahu in conjunction with the 
Treaty Tribes Coalition have communicated their dismay at the Government's 
handling of the foreshore and seabed issue at the United Nations Forum on 
Indigenous Issues in New York.74 Anti-Bill sentiment in fact culminated in a Hikoi to 
Parliament on May 5 2004. Some estimates put the participation in that Hi"koi at 
20,000 people.75 
Clearly this nascent legislation is highly controversial. In this atmosphere of 
controversy the Attorney-General provided a section seven report on the Bill. This 
paper does not assert that the Attorney-General's report was anything other than 
thorough, well considered or a valid exercise of the function under section seven. 
However, of importance is the appearance of bias. It is the potential for the 
appearance of bias which this analysis will focus on. It will be shown that the reasons 
for the potential for appearance of bias are integrally connected to the factors involved 
in a section seven analysis. 
The Attorney-General's report states that there is no prima facie breach of sections 
20, 21 or 27 (3) (rights of minorities, unreasonable search and seizure, and the right of 
every person to bring proceedings against the Crown ... and the right to have those 
proceedings heard, according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings between 
individuals) of the Act. The Attorney-General accepted that there was a strong 
71 Attorney-General v Ngiiti Apa [2003] 3NZLR 643 per Elias J 670 
72 See general ly; pre-amble to the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2003 
73 See generally: Nglii Tahu Media Release (11 May 2004) < http//: www.ngaitahu.iwi.nz >(last 
accessed 11 June 2004) 
74 Above n74 
75 See generally: <http//: www.kiwiblog.co.nz/archives> (last accessed 11 June 2004). 
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argument for a prima facie breach of section 19 (freedom from discrimination) and so 
went on to consider whether the section five test was met (i.e. whether the prima facie 
infringement of the Act is "demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic 
society"). The Attorney-General concluded that if there was a prima facie breach, it 
was a justifiable limitation in a free and democratic society .76 
The Attorney- General's report firstly sets out the reasons for her finding that 
there is no prima facie breach of sections 20, 21, 27(3). The report then examines the 
section 19 issue. The Attorney-General acknowledges that section 19 requires that 
where legislation affects the enjoyment of property rights it must do so in a non-
discriminatory way which does not target or affect one racial group as against 
another.77 The Attorney-General states that there are strong arguments in favour of a 
prima facie breach of section 19 on the basis that the Bill appears to treat holders of 
"specified freehold interests" and Maori Customary landowners differently (i.e. only 
the rights of the latter group are extinguished). The Attorney-General concedes that 
for one group to be deprived of an existing source of rights or title, yet another not to 
be similarly deprived, reaches the threshold of prima facie breach.78 
The Attorney-General then goes on to assess whether the section five test is met. 
Section five states that the rights and freedoms in the Act may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
At this point it is imp011ant to examine the section five test. This is because its 
application is relevant to the problems intrinsic in section seven of the Act. The 
operation of the section seven function requires the Attorney-General to assess 
whether there is a prima facie breach of the Act. The breach must then be examined 
against section five.79 If it is found that the provision is a justified limitation on a 
particular right in te1ms of section five, then that is the end of the matter. 
76 See generally: The Report of the Attorney-General 011 the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2003, 6 May 
2004, <http//: www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 11 June 2004) 
77 Above n76, para 53 
78 Above n76, para 79 
79 PA Joseph, above n 12, I 052 
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Section five by its very nature requires a political rather than legal analysis. As Sir 
lvor Richardson has stated, section five is one of the Act's provisions reflecting the 
reality that rights are not absolute and may be modified in the public interest to take 
into consideration the rights of other individuals and the interests of the whole 
comrnunity. 80 The Court of Appeal in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of 
Review
81 
discussed the method required to determine whether a particular limitation 
of a right or freedom can be justified in terms of section five. The Court made it clear 
that whether a limitation can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society is a matter of judgment to be made on behalf of society. The judgment must 
be made after considering all the issues which may have an influence on a particular 
case. These considerations may well include social, moral, economic, administrative, 
ethical, or legal matters. 82 
Therefore, section five requires political and policy analysis considerations rather 
than a strict legal analysis. The exercise required by section five has been described as 
a 'utilitarian calculation as to where the public welfare lies' .83 Determining where the 
public interest lies is always going to be a judgment based on policy considerations 
rather than a legal decision. In essence this means that section seven requires the 
Attorney-General to undertake an analysis that is political. This is where a 'manifest 
contradiction' arises. Section seven is premised on the basis that the Attorney-General 
will carry out a scrutinising function in his or her capacity as the impartial senior law 
officer of the Crown. However, in reality, the exercise of the function, in part, 
requires political analysis. The potential for the blurring of the line between impartial 
legal advisor and politician therefore arises. It is at this stage that the dual roles of the 
Attorney-General become irreconcilable and the possibility of the appearance of bias 
becomes an issue. This irreconcilability, rather than inherent in the position of the 
office of the Attorney-General, is created by section seven itself. Below is a 
discussion of the practical reality of the irreconcilability as it arose in relation to the 
Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2003. 
so Sir Ivor Richardson, 'Rights Jurisprudence-Justice for All?' in PA Joseph, Essays 011 the Constitwion 
(Wel lington, Brookers 1995) 75 
81 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2NZLR 9 
82 Moonen, above n8 I per Tipping J, 17 
83 
See JA Smillie' The Draft Bill of Rights: Meaningful Safeguards or mere window dressing?" [ 1985] 
NZLJ 376 at 378 cited in PA Joseph, above n 12, l 037 
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Sir Ivor Richardson's concept of the 'utilitarian assessment' implicit in section 
five is endorsed at paragraph 80 of the Attorney-General's report. At paragraph 81 the 
report explicitly states that the first matters for consideration are the Government's 
reasons for introducing the Bill and that an assessment will be made weighing up the 
advantages and disadvantages that may accrue to those Maori and others who may be 
affected by the Bill. 84 The reasons stated for introducing the Bill are those set out in 
the pre-amble to the Bill as discussed above. Some might take the cynical view that 
there may have been other reasons for introduction of the Bill. The report, however, 
puts forward the official reasons for introducing the legislation. These reasons include 
the fact that New Zealand is an island nation and the coastline plays an important part 
in the social, cultural and economic lives of all New Zealanders and therefore there 
should be no uncertainty about the nature and extent of public rights in relation to the 
foreshore and seabed.85 The Attorney-General comes to the conclusion that; 
'taken in conjunction with existing mechanisms for the recognition and protection of Maori 
Common Law customary interests in the foreshore and seabed (e.g. the fisheries legislation) and in 
conjunction with the likely future recognition of such interest (e.g. in relation to aquaculture), I 
consider that the Bill meets the section 5 Lest' .86 
On the above basis the Foreshore and Seabed Bill is stated not to be in breach of 
the Act. 
3. APPLICATION OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS ANALYSIS 
The above example of the section seven process in action raises a number of 
issues . These issues relate to the concept of apparent bias or a lack of independence. 
The report in relation to the Foreshore and Seabed Bill is the most striking recent 
illustration of the irreconcilable roles of the Attorney-General under section seven. 
The proposed legislation was hugely unpopular to the point of engendering civil 
protest action. In this milieu the Government was placed in the position of justifying 
the Bill. Difficulty arises because the Attorney-General who is also a Member of the 
Cabinet then had to report on the Bill in terms of compliance with the Act. That report 
84 Above n 7 6, para 8 I 
85 Above n76, para 88 
86 Above n 7 6, para l 03 
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in addressing the issue, canvasses the Government's reasons for introducing the Bill 
in depth. The assessment of whether clause 19 of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill was 
inconsistent with the Act clearly involved pure policy considerations rather than any 
legal analysis. This could be viewed as crossing the blurry line into the realms of 
political justification. Moreover, apparent bias also becomes an issue in relation to the 
fact that the very legislation scrutinised by the Attorney-General was in direct 
response to litigation which culminated in an unfavourable result for the Government. 
In fact that litigation was originally brought in the name of the Attorney-General. 
Despite the theory of a non-partisan Attorney-General, in situations such as the 
above questions arise in relation to the appearance of bias or a lack of independence. 
Whatever, the reality may be, it is the appearance of these things which is crucial in 
terms of Fairness or Natural Justice. In order for our human rights commitment to be 
taken seriously Justice must be seen to be done. If the Government is faced with 
justifying controversial legislation it is inappropriate for the Attorney-General to 
scrutinise that legislation. Such scrutiny runs the risk of appearing tainted by the 
potential for bias or pre-determination because of the irreconcilable duties placed on 
the Attorney-General by virtue of section seven. These irreconcilable duties can be 
characterised as the duty to scrutinise as impartial law officer of the Crown and the 
duty to undertake a policy analysis as to where the public welfare lies in respect of the 
section five test. This policy analysis could potentially appear to be influenced by the 
Attorney-General 's role as a member of the Cabinet. 
In the above circumstances it is wholly inappropriate that the Attorney-
General continues as scrutineer pursuant to section seven. This is because New 
Zealand's commitment to human rights necessitates reform to bring the Act in line 
with principles analogous to Fairness. Moreover, the potential for the appearance of 
bias is a real threat to public confidence in the Act and its processes. The nature of the 
Act, as New Zealand's primary human right's legislations, dictates that any risk to 
public faith in the Act is unacceptable. 
Before leaving analysis of section seven and turning to consider options for 
reform, it is vital to ask whether the cure is worse than the complaint. No common 
sense lies in proposing major reform if the difficulties associated with that reform 
24 
outweigh the original difficulties precipitating the reform. It is hoped that throughout 
this paper the application of the Natural Justice policy analysis has highlighted the 
significant flaws in the current process and the serious consequences of these flaws. 
Impartiality, transparency and fairness are integral to the integrity of our legal and 
political system. It may sound grandiose, however, in effect the integrity of the system 
is crucial for public faith and public faith in the system is a necessary requirement for 
the successful operation of the Rule of Law. At present the appearance of bias and 
transparency issues created by the section seven process have the potential to erode 
public confidence and compromise the integrity of the system. It is submitted that in 
light of implications of this, the need for reform to cure the ill outweighs any 
inconvenience caused by reform. 
VI OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
Any reform which is undertaken must cause the least upheaval possible and 
must not create more significant problems than those sought to be cured. Two obvious 
possible reform options initially present themselves. The first is the complete removal 
of section seven and the empowering of the judiciary to strike down legislation which 
is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. The second is the removal of the Attorney-
General as scrutineer. The role of scrutineer would be devolved to another appropriate 
entity. Both these options are radical. An assessment of these options below will show 
that the first option is not viable in the current milieu. However, the second option 
provides a starting point for considering the reform of section seven. 
The Justice and Law Reform Committee in its final report on the White Paper 
recommended the introduction of a bill of rights which was an unentrenched ordinary 
statute which was not supreme law. One of the major reasons for opposition to a 
supreme statue was the argument that it would lead to the inappropriate redistribution 
of power from elected accountable representatives of the people to an unelected 
judiciary whose members retained their positions until retirement.87 At the time the 
New Zealand public was seen as not ready for a 'fully fledged' bill of rights88 which 
included the power of the Judiciary to strike down legislation. As an adjunct to its 
87 See: Justice and Law Reform Committee, 'Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee 
on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand' [ 1987-1990] AJ HR vol. XVII 1.8 c, 3 
88 Above n87, 3 
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recommendation that an unentrenched bill of rights which was not supreme law be 
introduced, the Justice and Law Reform Committee suggested the incorporation of 
what is now section seven. As discussed, the theory behind section seven was that in 
the absence of judicial power to strike down legislation for inconsistency with the 
Act, section seven would have a 'prophylactic' effect on new legislation.89 In other 
words section seven has provided an obstacle to the introduction of inconsistent 
legislation, which theoretically assuages the impact of section four. 
If section seven were to be repealed then arguably the need for judicial power 
to strike down inconsistent legislation would be required. This is because in the 
absence of section seven there are no formal checks or balances in place to impede the 
enactment of legislation in contravention of the Act. The question is whether this is a 
viable option at this time? It appears that question can be answered in the negative. 
Events in the near past suggest that the New Zealand public and parliamentarians are 
not ready to vest the Judiciary with the significant power to strike legislation down. 
This is evident in the fact that the Judiciary has been subject to heavy criticism 
recently. The Hon. Michael Cullen has made it patently clear that there would be no 
Governmental support for any move to empower the judiciary. He describes the 
erosion of Parliament Sovereignty as 'a half-pie Americanisation of our judicial 
system which would be of no benefit in the long term. '90 This year has also seen 
growing acrimony between the Chief Justice and Attorney-General revolving around 
the new Supreme Court.91 As well as attacks by the Government on the judicial 
system, public faith in the system appears to be at a low. This is evident in the fact 
that Cabinet has approved the Law Commission's suggestion to open up the Family 
Court to accredited news media. This move was seen as necessary by the Government 
to maintain confidence in the Court and remove perceptions that the closed Court 
system allows 'unfair processes and bias' .92 
89 AS Butler, 'Strengthening the Bill of Rights' (2000) 31 VUWLR 129, 145, see also discussion in 
Part II Significance of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 and section seven, above. 
90 Hon Michael Cullen, 'Address to Governor-General on the 150th Anniversary of the New Zealand 
Parliament' (24 May 2004) NZPD vol.617, 13192-139193 
91 See: 'Court in the middle of a turf war' R Laugesen, Sunday Star Times I August 2004 C4 
92 Hon David Benson Pope " Family Court to be more open" (22 September 2004) Media Release 
available at http//: www.beehive.govt.nz (last accessed 28 September 2004) 
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In the current atmosphere of conflict between Government and the Bench, and 
public mistrust, which stems in part from misconceptions concerning the functioning 
of the closed Family Court system, New Zealand does not yet appear ready for a 
Judiciary empowered to strike down legislation. 
What then is an appropriate alternative for the Attorney-General as scrutineer 
under section seven? It is acknowledged that this is a formidable challenge. No 
wholly suitable replacement readily presents itself. The goal of this paper is therefore, 
to canvass several options for reform and assess their relative strengths and 
weaknesses in order to arrive at the most viable alternative. The most feasible 
substitute bodies appear to be a Select Committee, independent body outside the 
Parliamentary system, or a quasi-independent entity akin to an Officer of the House or 
Parliament which acts as advisory counsel to the House. Below is an examination of 
these three options. This examination will lead to a conclusion as to the most 
practicable solution. 
A. SELECT COMMITTEE 
If the most obvious starting point in canvassing the substitution options is 
a body already established within the parliamentary system, then a Select Committee 
is the principle contender. There is much to recommend the Select Committee as a 
substitute scrutineer. However, there are a number of weaknesses in the argument for 
a Select Committee which must also be addressed. 
Select Committees are linked to particular areas of Government activity. The 
committees examine and report on Bills within their subject area. They also look at 
the administration, expenditure and policy of the Departments and quangos associated 
with their subject area. Certain other Select Committees such as the Privileges 
Committee and the Officers of Parliament Committee exist to carry out specialist 
functions and enable the smooth functioning of the House.
93 
The substitution of the Select Committee as a scrutineer would not be a radical 
departure from original thinking. This is because the Select Committee was in fact the 
93 See: PA Joseph, above nl2, 338 
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first body posited as a suitable scrutineer when section seven was born following the 
abandonment of the concepts of supreme law and entrenchment in relation to the Bill 
of Rights. The 'Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee on a White 
Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand' 94 suggested that the Standing Orders could 
be amended to establish a committee to examine Bill of Rights matters. Such a 
Committee could be empowered to consider all Bills and regulations in terms of the 
Act and report to the House on consistency.95 This idea was not adopted. Instead the 
Attorney-General was given the reporting function. 
Not only has the idea of a scrutineer Select Committee found favour with the 
Justice and Law Reform Committee but also with the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives Mr David McGee. The Clerk made a number of submissions in 
relation to the recent review of the Standing Orders.96 One of the proposals put 
forward by the Clerk was the recommendation that Select Committees report on 
whether provisions in the Bills they examine appear to limit any of the rights or 
freedoms contained in the Act. It is clear that this proposal is not directly analogous to 
the reform proposals this paper canvasses. This is because the Clerk's 
recommendation concerning a scrutiny obligation for Select Committees was to be 
supplementary to the Attorney-General's obligation.97 The rationale in part behind the 
Clerk's recommendation in relation to Select Committees was the fact that Select 
Committees do not have enough direction from the House in regard to examining 
legislation and would benefit from increased direction. Having BORA compliance 
consideration obligations clearly set out in the Standing Orders would enhance the 
level of direction.98 The Clerk's submissions also recommended that the Standing 
Orders Committee consider whether to recommend that the statutory reporting 
scheme under section seven be extended to amendments proposed to a Bill as it is 
being debated by the House.99 The reason given by the Clerk, Mr McGee, for this 
94 Justice and Law Reform Committee "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee on a 
White Paper for New Zealand" [ 1987-90] AJHR XVll l 8c, JO 
95 Above n94, 10 
96 See generally: Clerk of the House of Representatives, Submissions of the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives on Review of the Standing Orders, (submission to the Standing Orders Committee, 
2003) < http//: www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz >(last accessed 16 June 2004). 
97 Above n96, Recommendation 49 
98 Interview with the Clerk of the House, Mr David McGee (the author, 22 July 2004, at Parliament). 
99Clerk of the House of Representatives, Submissions of the Clerk of the House of Representatives on 
Review of the Standing Orders, (submission to the Standing Orders Committee, 2003) 
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proposal is that such a requirement would act as a brake on the Parliamentary process. 
If the statutory reporting scheme was to be extended to amendments proposed to a 
Bill this would require the House to pause to think or reflect on the Bill of Rights 
consequences of legislation passing through the system. According to the Clerk, the 
real deficiency in the system at the moment is that no notice of amendments has to be 
given and there is little if any time to reflect on proposed amendments. 100 If the 
Clerk's suggestion had been adopted it would have held up the process so that 
appropriate consideration could be given to proposed amendments. 
It is submitted that the significance of the Clerk's recommendations is that 
they illustrate that there are serious difficulties with the section seven process which 
those at the front line of parliamentary work recognise. The proposal for Select 
Committee scrutiny canvassed by this paper is radically different to the Clerk's idea 
of an additional scrutineer. However, it may be argued that the Clerk's submissions 
lend some weight to the notion that a Select Committee could effectively carry out a 
Bill of Rights scrutiny function. 
It should be noted that the Clerk did not agree with the proposal posited in this 
paper. Mr McGee was of the view that in practical terms we have the best compliance 
system in comparison with any other potential system. According to the Clerk, in 
reality work goes on behind the scenes between the Ministry of Justice and other 
Departments to secure compliance and the threat of an adverse Bill of Rights report is 
an effective tool to keep Departments in line. 101 The writer acknowledges with respect 
the Clerk's view, especially given his Office's position at the coal-face of political 
reality. However, it could be argued that the status quo described by the Clerk still 
raises serious concerns in relation to the transparency of government. These are the 
concerns that the proposals in this paper seek to address. 
Recommendation 40. It should be noted that Recommendation 49 also proposed that a new requirement 
be added to the Standing Orders that Select Committees test their own recommended amendments. 
100 Above n96, The Standing Orders Committee did not adopt these recommendation in its Review of 
the Standing Orders (2003) published at http//: www .clerk.parliamenuzovt.nz. When asked why he 
thought these recommendation had not been adopted Mr McGee replied that it should be remembered 
that in a political environment it is a government's aim to have their political objectives achieved. 
Governments do not consider that they need to place further obstacles in their way. 
101 Interview with the Clerk of the House Mr David McGee (the author, 22 July 2004, at Parliament). 
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So then the Select Committee has clearly been promoted as a potentially 
suitable entity for scrutiny. An argument lending weight to the Clerk's and the Justice 
and Law Reform Committee's stance is the fact that the Select Committee is already 
firmly entrenched within the parliamentary system and is governed by established 
rules and procedures. For example Standing Order ('SO') 189 clearly sets out the 
functions of each particular SO. The benefits of Select Committee integration within 
the system and the existence of rules governing Select Committees are two-fold. First, 
in comparison with creating an entirely new scrutineer entity, minimal reform would 
be required. Potentially, the requisite reform would simply require amendment of 
section seven and the SO to establish a Bill of Rights Compliance Select Committee. 
The SO would then clearly set out the functions of this committee. Secondly and more 
importantly, the fact that Select Committees are already firmly established within the 
system means that Parliamentarians are familiar and comfortable with them and hence 
more likely to accept them as a viable alternative to the Attorney-General. 
So if the Select Committee were acceptable to Parliamentarians would it be 
acceptable to the general public from an appearance of bias stand-point? An argument 
can be mounted that the Select Committee suffers less from the semblance of 
partisanship than the Attorney-General as scrutineer. It is true that the Select 
Committee is still comprised of members of the Government. However, membership 
of Select Committees must, so far as reasonably practicable be proportional to the 
party membership in the House (SO 185(1)). In addition, Cabinet Ministers are no 
longer members of the subject Select Committees. Academics have argued that this 
reflects an attempt to separate the Executive from Parliament's function. 102 In this 
way Select Committees can be seen as avoiding the same level of political taint that 
the Attorney-General as sole scrutineer attracts . 
The fact that Select Committees are clearly subject to Natural Justice adds 
weight to the argument that they may be a suitable scrutineer. In 1995 Professor 
Joseph reported to the Standing Orders Committee on the application of Natural 
102 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Professor Matthew Palmer, Bridled Power New Zealand's Co11 stitwio11 and 
Govemment (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2004), 174 
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Justice to the parliamentary environment. 103 That report states that the right to Natural 
Justice as recognised by section 27 (1) of the Act clearly applies to the House and its 
committees with some concessions taking in to account the functions of the House. 104 
The SOs reflect this. For example SO 232 provides for disqualification of a member 
for apparent bias. This paper has argued that it is imperative that principles analogous 
to Natural Justice apply to any body carrying out the section seven function. As such a 
body which is clearly ruled by Natural Justice presents an attractive option for reform. 
Finally, in favour of a Select Committee as substitute scrutineer is the fact that 
there is already an established body which could potentially take over the Attorney-
General's role with relative ease. If it is accepted that a Select Committee is a viable 
option then the Regulations Review Committee ('RRC') is a natural choice for 
reform. This is because it already carries out a scrutinising function in relation to 
regulations. The SO set out the functions and obligations of the RRC. These include 
examining all regulations 105 and the Committee may consider any matter relating to 
the regulations and report on this to the House.106 The RRC' s functions would have to 
be extensively amended if it was to adopt the section seven function. This is because 
there is a significant difference between scrutinising delegated legislation in terms of 
procedural and ultra vires issues and scrutinising primary legislation in relation to 
substantive rights considerations. Although, of note is the fact that one of the grounds 
on which the RRC is to bring a regulation to the special attention of the House 
includes the fact that the regulation 'trespasses unduly on personal rights and 
liberties' .107 In essence this is a function not dissimilar to that required under section 
seven. As the Rt Hon Jonathan Hunt has said of the RRC: 
' (the RRC) has an important constitutional role to ensure that law-making powers are 
exercised within the limits set by Parliament ' 108 
103 See: P Joseph "Report to the Standing Orders Conunittee on Natural Justice" (1995) AJHR ll8A 
Appendix F. 
104 Above nl03, 213 and 216 
105 Standing Order 377 ( l) 
106 Standing Order 377 (4) 
107 Standing Order 378 ( l) (b) 
108 Rt Hon J Hunt, "The Regul ations Revi ew Committee"[ 1990] NZU 402, 408. 
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A description similar to the Member's comments above is surely one of the goals of 
any body created to undertake the section seven function. 
Despite the fact that significant reform would be needed, the appeal of the 
RRC is the fact that the seeds of scrutinising ability already exist within its current 
functions. In fact the Justice and Law Reform Committee recognised its potential for 
carrying out the section seven function in its final report on the White Paper. 109 
Finally, prima facie the Select Committee appears an attractive option 
because it has a precedent in the United Kingdom ('UK') Joint Committee on Human 
Rights ('JCHR'). This is a committee of the UK Parliament. The JCHR has a function 
similar to that of the Attorney-General under section seven. Under section 19 of the 
UK Human Right's Act 1998 ('the UK Act') the Minister in charge of a Bill in either 
House must make a statement as to compatibility with the UK Act. However, the 
procedure adopted to implement section 19 is much broader than the New Zealand 
procedure. 110 
The JCHR comes into play beyond the compatibility statement procedure. The 
Committee examines every Bill presented to Parliament and assesses it in terms of 
compliance with the UK Act and also provisions of other international human rights 
instruments to which the UK is a signatory. 111 Its terms of reference also include 
consideration of matters relating to Human Rights in the UK but excluding individual 
cases. 112 A key function of the JCHR is scrutinising section 19 ministerial 
statements. 113 
In relation to its operation, the JCHR appears to have broad powers relating to 
its function. For example it can require the submission of written evidence and 
109 Justice and Law Reform Committee, "Final Report on the White Paper for a Bill of Rights for ew 
Zealand by the Justice and Law Reform Committee", [ 1987-1990] AJHR XVII I 8C 10 
110 See generally: L Hare, Parliamentary Scrutiny Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): A comparative analysis (LLB (Hons) Research Paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2002) 15. 
111 <http//: www.publications.parliament.uk- > 'Joint Committee on Human Rights Thirteenth Report'. 
112 <http//: www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom >(last accessed 12 June 2004) 
113 Joint Committee on Human Rights 'Joint Committee on Human Rights Fourteenth Report, Session 
2001-2002, Scrutiny of Bills: Private Member's and Private Bills (8 March 2002) para I cited in L 
Hare, above n 110, 17 
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documents. It can also examine witnesses, appoint specialist advisors and make 
reports to both Houses.
114 It has a maximum of six members appointed by each 
House. Currently, the membership is comprised of six Members of the House of 
Lords from the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative Parties and six members 
of the House of Lords associated with the three aforementioned political parties. 115 
The JCHR has been a positive Human Rights protection in the UK. It is the 
'public watchdog' 116 of the JCHR that gives section 19 of the UK Act its muscle. 117 
Therefore, the JCHR appears to provide a successful precedent for any New Zealand 
Select Committee undertaking the Bill of Rights scrutiny function. This will be 
addressed further below. 
There are a number of strong arguments in favour of a Select Committee 
acting as substitute scrutineer which have been traversed above. However, it is argued 
that a number of serious problems arise in relation to the Select Committee model 
which may ultimately render it inappropriate as a substitute. 
The most glaring problem with the Select Committee model is that it is 
essentially still a political animal. The Select Committee is comprised of politicians 
each with their own party agendas and political concerns. If a primary goal of 
substitution is to remove any appearance of political bias then the Select Committee 
as a model would not be truly acceptable as an alternative. Moreover, it is debatable 
whether it is wholly appropriate for a quasi-partisan body to deal with Human Rights 
issues. It is submitted that Bill of Rights issues are too important to risk being the tool 
of political positioning and game playing. The fact that the Select Committee is 
comprised of members from different political parties may also mean that consensus 
might be difficult to reach on Bill of Rights issues. In fact the SO specifically allow 
for the divergent opinions of Select Committee members to be incorporated into the 
Select Committee's recommendations. 11 8 It is posited that this might have the effect 
114 <http//: www. ublications.pa rliame nt.uk >(last accessed 10 June 2004) 
11 5 Above nl 12 
116 A Lester "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legi slation Under the Human Rights Act 1998" (2002) 33 
VUWLR 1, 24. 
11 7 Above nl 16 
11 8 Standing Order 244 
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of lessening the weight of the recommendation and Bill of Rights issues are too 
significant to be the subject of lukewarm recommendations. 
Another innate problem with the Select Committee model is the constitution 
of its membership. The Select Committee is made up of politicians and generally not 
trained legal counsel. In this respect it may be distinguished from the JHCR. For 
example the current JCHR includes a couple of QCs, a former law lecturer, and a 
solicitor. The current Chairperson the Rt Honourable Jean Carston MP is also a 
b . 119 Th. h h . arr1ster. 1s ensures t at t e issues are considered and reported on by those with 
a great deal of legal expertise and experience. 
Another reason why a Committee such as the RRC would not be a suitable 
replacement is the fact that a Committee produces recommendations. A Select 
Committee produces a recommendatory report to the House which may incorporate 
differing views of the members rather than a definitive legal opinion on which the 
House may choose to rely. The need for scrutiny or examination of a piece of 
legislation in relation to Bill of Rights compliance by its very nature requires a 
definitive legal opinion and not a series of recommendations. Given the significance 
of Bill of Rights issues it is appropriate that the House is presented with a definitive 
legal opinion in relation to the issues rather than a merely recommendatory report 
which may not contain a consensus opinion on the issue. Any level of uncertainty is 
unsuitable in relation to Bill of Rights matters and these matters must be accorded the 
weight that a recommendatory report cannot provide. 
Finally, it should be noted that the JCHR is not an ideal model for New 
Zealand. As the Clerk of the House asserted to the writer, this is because the UK 
system is very different to the system in New Zealand. 120 On a basic level the UK 
Parliament is a much larger bi-camera! Parliament compared with New Zealand's 
small uni-camera! legislature. The existence of the House of Lords, which contains a 
number of distinguished legal counsel, obviously has implications in relation to the 
functioning of a committee with a consideration and reporting function and the quality 
119 Sec generally: <http//: www.Parliament.uk/parliamentary-committees> (last accessed 28 July 
2004) . For example both Lord Lester of Herne-Hill and Lord Campbell of Alloway are Queen's 
Counsel and Kevin McNamara Esq, MP is a former lecturer in law at Hull College of Commerce. 
120 Interview with the Clerk of the House, Mr David McGee, (the author, 22 July 2004, at Parliament). 
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of the final product presented to the House.
121 The level of legal expertise and the 
different nature of New Zealand's Select Committee system due to the nature of our 
Parliament and electoral system mean it is doubtful a scrutineer Select Committee 
could achieve the standard of the JCHR. 
B. INDEPENDENT BODY 
If the Select Committee model is tainted by partisanship, would a truly 
independent body advising the House be more appropriate? This model presupposes a 
body sitting outside the parliamentary system. This body might be akin to an 
independent tribunal made up of professional and perhaps lay people. 
There are precedents for independent bodies which undertake statutory duties 
and functions under the umbrella of a Minister of Government whilst maintaining the 
appearance of independence. One such example is the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
('the Tribunal'). In general terms the Minister of Health detem1ines how many 
tribunals exist at one time and appoints the members . The Tribunal then undertakes its 
functions independently of the Ministry of Health. Each tribunal comprises three 
members, one of which must be a psychiatrist and one which must be a barrister or 
solicitor. 122 The Tribunal reviews the status of patients who are subject to compulsory 
treatment orders and who have been assessed as unfit to be released from the order.
123 
The Tribunal also investigates complaints concerning breach of patient rights after an 
investigation of the complaint if the patient finds an initial investigation 
unsatisfactory. 124 The Tribunal prepares a written decision similar to a legal judgment 
in relation to its reviews and investigations. Other examples of independent bodies 
exercising statutory powers and functions include the Tenancy Tribunal and the 
Commerce Commission. 
These bodies largely carry out decision- making functions and as such are not 
directly analogous to the functions which would be undertaken by a Bill of Rights 
121 See: above nl20 
122 Mental Health (Compulsory As ess ment and Treatment) Act 1992, s lOl (l) and (2). 
123 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s l02 
124 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s75 
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compliance body. However, an independent statutory body such as the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal which has the ability to focus on legal and policy issues and provide 
a quasi-legal decision, might provide a starting point for an appropriate model. The 
type of body envisaged by this paper is a panel comprised of practising lawyers, 
retired judges or retired officers of Parliament (such as a former Race-Relations 
Conciliator) who have a working knowledge of the Act. It might be that the body has 
the power to appoint specialist advisors on an ad hoe basis to advise on specific policy 
. h · 125 issues as t ey anse. 
Several arguments make the independent body appear attractive as a 
potential model. The first of these is the fact that such a body would avoid any 
appearance of bias, which is one of the major flaws of section seven as it stands. Such 
a body would be comprised of members who are outside the parliamentary system 
and therefore would not be constricted by political considerations in the way 
politicians inevitably are. Moreover, the approach taken by non-politicians to Bill of 
Rights compliance issues would appear more objective and legalistic than an analysis 
by politicians. This might engender more confidence in the process amongst the 
public who are traditionally sceptical of politicians and their intentions . 
Further, there is greater scope for the incorporation of members with the 
appropriate skills for Bill of Rights compliance analysis than in a Select Committee. 
Unlike, the JHCR, Select Committees in New Zealand do not contain the same level 
of legal expertise. Select Committees in New Zealand are comprised of politicians 
who may or may not have a modicum of legal training. The independent body model 
is premised on the basis that the members will have extensive legal and perhaps 
policy knowledge . It may be that this would have a positive impact on the quality of 
Bill of Rights compliance advice to the House. This cannot be a negative thing. 
Notwithstanding, the positive aspects of an independent body, some serious 
obstacles present themselves. 
125 See: Mental llealth (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s I 03 which gives the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal panel the power to co-opt suitable people to sit on the Tribunal on a 
one-off basis in special circumstances. 
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The pnmary drawback of such a model is that Parliamentarians may be 
reluctant to accept an independent body as an alternative for two reasons. First, the 
concept might impinge on the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty and secondly, from a 
logistical standpoint the establishment of such a body would involve significant 
reform and resources. 
The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is a crucial part of the 
Westminster system of government, which was born from writings and decisions in 
the seventeenth century .126 The doctrine encapsulates the idea that Parliament is 
supreme. As Sir Edward Coke was quoted by Blackstone: 127 
' so long therefore as the English constitution lasts we may venture to affirm that the power of 
Parliament is absolute and without control'. 
Dicey described Parliament as 'supreme legislator' 128 and in real terms 
neither the Courts nor any other body may invalidate or control an enactment of 
Parliament. 129 This principle is still recognised today three hundred years after its 
birth. For example Justice Robertson's persuasive obiter in Rothmans of Pall Mall 
(NZ) Ltd v AG 130 makes it clear that the constitutional position is unambiguous: 
'Parliament is supreme ... The Courts do not have the power to consider the validity of 
properly enacted laws.' 131 
The risk, therefore, is that there are those who would see an independent body 
outside the boundaries of Parliament which scrutinises legislation as usurping the 
functions and powers of Parliament. It could be argued that in accordance with the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty it should be a parliamentary body which 
assesses legislation for compliance under the Act. Recent comments made in the 
House on the 1501h Anniversary of Parliament make it clear that Parliamentary 
126 The Laws of New Zealand Constitutional Law, (3) Parliament, Parliamentary Sovereignty, Basic 
Principles, para 7 l<http//: www.butterworthsonlinc.com> (last accessed 26 June 2004) 
127 William Blackstone, W Morrison ed., Blackstone's Commentaries 011 the Laws of England' vol. I 
(London, Cavendish Publishing, 2001), 120. 
128 AV Dicey /mroduction to the Swdy of the Law of the Co11stitwio11 ( IOed, MacMillan, London, 
1960) 411 
129 Above, n 128 
130 Roth111a11s of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd vAG [1991] 2NZLR 323 
131 Above n 130, 330 
37 
Sovereignty is close to the heart of many Parliamentarians. The Deputy Prime 
Minister the Honourable Dr Michael Cullen rigorously argued for the protection of 
Parliamentary sovereignty; 
" There is an increasing tendency to challenge the exercise of . .. (Parliamentary) sovereignty. 
This comes not just from some radical Maori. It also comes from within the heart of New Zealand's 
judiciary ... we are approaching the point where Parliament may need to be more assertive in defence 
of its own sovereignty ... for the sake of good order and govemment." 132 
As discussed above, there is a heightened sensitivity by parliamentarians to 
issues affecting Parliamentary sovereignty. 
It is submitted that the scrutinising contemplated would not in fact impinge on 
Parliamentary sovereignty as the independent body would simply be providing an 
opinion to the House. Ultimately the power would reside in the House to accept the 
advice and act accordingly or disregard the advice. Despite this, of concern is the fact 
that there may be those who would still consider such an independent body as 
trampling on Parliamentary sovereignty . 
Close to the hearts of many Parliamentarians is also the issue of resource 
allocation and logistical difficulties. If a new scrutinising body were formed, 
substantial ref01m would be required. A great deal of work would have to be 
undertaken to decide on the appropriate formulation of such a body. Legislation and 
regulations would have to be drafted to establish and regulate the body. Finally, 
people with the requisite skills would have to be identified and secured as members of 
the body. An education programme might also have to be undertaken to garner the 
support of the public and politicians. The necessary reform is significant. Significant 
reform involves substantial financial and people resources . It is questionable, 
therefore, whether Parliamentarians would be prepared to accept such a reform. 
Finally , a body still faces problems associated with the end product. Because a 
body is comprised of a number of constituent members with potentially differing 
opinions what would be produced after analysis of the relevant legislative provision is 
132 Hon Dr Michael Cullen (Deputy Prime Minister) address to the Governor-General on the 150
1
1, 
Anniversary of the New Zealand Parliament, (24 May 2004) NZPD 617, 13192 
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a report. This report would be similar to the recommendatory report produced by a 
Select Committee. It is clear that the effective exercise of the section seven function 
requires the production of a definitive legal opinion and not a recommendatory report 
as discussed above. 
C QUASI-INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 
The major flaws identified in relation to the options for reform identified so 
far are a failure to avoid the semblance of bias or a lack of independence, potential 
non-acceptance by Parliamentarians and the capacity only for production of 
recommendatory reports rather than definitive legal opinions. The question, therefore, 
is can a model be found that is capable of producing definitive legal opinions and is 
sufficiently independent yet still acceptable to those within the parliamentary system? 
Establishing such a model is a formidable challenge. 
If one tries to find precedents within the system for a model that is both 
acceptable to politicians and yet wears the mantle of independence the obvious choice 
is an entity akin to an Officer of Parliament or an Officer of the House. 133 
I. OFFICER OF PARLIAMENT OR THE HOUSE 
The inherent flaws in two viable possibilities for reform, which lie at opposite 
ends of the spectrum, have been traversed. On one hand, the Select Committee, can be 
seen as too entrenched in the party political system. The alternative option of a fully 
independent body outside the Parliamentary system suffers from a potential lack of 
acceptance due to its complete removal from the parliamentary system. The question, 
therefore, becomes whether a balance can be struck. A body is required which is 
sufficiently associated with the system to be accepted by Parliamentarians. However, 
the body must also appear independent to a degree that cures the current flaws in the 
section seven process. It must also incorporate people with the requisite skill base in 
133 The idea for an officer of the Hou e to undertake the function the writer is proposing was suggested 
to the writer as a possiblity by the Clerk of the House, Mr David McGee CNZM, QC at an interview on 
the 22"d July 2004 at Parliament. The writer is very grateful to Mr McGee for this suggestion. 
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order to provide quality advice to the House in the form of a definitive legal opinion. 
It is posited that the ideal candidate for this role is an Officer of Parliament or the 
House in the form of a quasi-independent legal counsel. 
This section will examine the role of an Officer of Parliament or the House, 
assess current examples of Officers of Parliament and the House, and evaluate 
potential strengths and weaknesses of this type of entity. A proposal will then be put 
forward for a legal advisory office or counsel to the House akin to an Officer of the 
House or Parliament to carry out the section seven function. 
In general, 'Officer of Parliament' ('OP') is a fluid term. There is no definition 
at law of what an OP entails. 134 Although, the Public Finance Act 1989 section two 
does state that an 'Officer of Parliament' means the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment, the Office of the Ombudsmen, and the Auditor-General as defined 
in section four of the Public Audit Act 2001. It has been said that the primary 
function of an OP should be as a check on the Executive. 135 Certainly this is a 
function that is consonant with that which is required under section seven. The 
Finance and Expenditure Committee reported on an inquiry into OPs in 1989. 136 This 
report led the way for the establishment of the 'Officers of Parliament Committee', 
the functions of which will be discussed below in relation to the issue of 
independence. The same report set out five criteria for the establishment of any new 
OP. Some of these criteria would be relevant to a Counsel for Bill of Rights 
Compliance if this role were to be created. These criteria include; 
a) An OP must only be set up to provide a check on the arbitrary use of power by 
the Executive. 
b) An OP should be created rarely. 
c) Each OP should be created in separate legislation devoted to that position. 137 
134 p A Joseph, above n 12, 361 
135 Finance and Expenditure Committee, "Report of the Finance and Expenditure Committee 1989; 
Report on the Enquiry into Officers of Parliament" ( 1987-90) AJHR XVI! I 4.B 5 
136 See generally: above n 135 
137 See: D McGee, 'Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand' (Government Printer Publications, 
Wellington, 1994) 56 
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If a suitable OP were to be established for the section seven function, these criteria 
would need to be adhered to. 
The real attraction of an OP is its semblance of independence. It is part of the 
parliamentary system yet distance is kept from political considerations. As the Clerk 
of the House Mr McGee has stated; 
'If a position is to be established as an Officer of Parliament it should be subject to the 
conditions that flow from being an arm of the legislative branch of the state such as being outside the 
public service and not subject to ministerial control' 138 
In assessing the independence of OPs it is necessary to examine the 
appointment procedure relating to them. The relevant legislation creating separate 
OPs will often set out an appointment procedure for the role. For example section 3 
(2) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975 states that the Governor-General on recommendation 
of the House shall appoint the Ombudsmen. This is subject to the limited exception 
that the Governor-General in Council may appoint an Ombudsman where a vacancy 
has occurred and Parliament is not in session. The House must confirm the 
appointment within two months of the commencement of the new session of 
Parliament, otherwise, the appointment will lapse. 139 Similarly, the Controller and 
Auditor General are also appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation 
of the House. 140 The Clerk has observed that a convention has arisen relating to the 
appointment procedure whereby in terms of recommendations to the House, the 
appropriate Minister should take a lead in identifying candidates. This may involve 
advertising for candidates for the position. 141 
In respect of independence issues, the role of the Officers of Parliament 
Committee ('OPC') must also be considered. Standing Order 381 sets out the 
functions of the OCP. 142 The OCP has a broad consideration and recommendation 
function in relation to funding, auditing, creation and appointment of Officers of 
Parliament. It must be noted that the House is not bound to follow the OCP' s 
138 Above nl37, 55 
139 See generall y: Ombudsmen Act 1975, s7 
140 Public Audit Act 2001, s7 (2) 
141 Above nl35, 56 
142 Standing Orders of the House of Represelltatives (As Amended 16 December 2003) SO 381 
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recommendations in relation to estimates to be included in the Appropriation Bill. 
Although, the convention appears to be that it invariably does 
Officers of Parliament 
There are a number of bodies that fall within the ambit of an 'Officer of 
Parliament'. A brief discussion of two such bodies will follow in order to assist with 
assessment of OPs as an appropriate option for reform. 
The office of the Audit-General and Controller is a well-established OP. The 
Public Audit Act 2001 sets out the functions and powers of the Auditor-General and 
Controller. The basic function of this office is to provide a check on the spending of 
public money and to maintain financial accountability in the public sector. As its 
name suggests the office is the auditor of every public entity. 143 In addition to 
financial auditing, the office may also 'performance audit' a public entity. This 
function includes looking at a public entity's compliance with its statutory obligations 
and the extent to which a public body is carrying out its activities effectively and 
efficiently .144 
The Ombudsmen' s office is another Officer of Parliament. Its functions are set 
out in section 13 of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. In general these functions include 
investigating complaints concerning administrative decisions or recommendations or 
failure to disclose official infonnation on request made by government bodies. The 
Ombudsmen then have a reporting function in relation to the Department or 
· · d 145 orgamsat10n concerne . 
Officers of the House 
In New Zealand the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives is 
classified as an Officer of the House. 146 The function of the Office of the Clerk is to 
act as the legislature's secretariat. The Office provides assistance and specialist advice 
143 Public Audit Act 2001, s 14. The Act sets out an exhaustive list of bodies that constitute 'public 
entities'. These include; the Crown, Offices of Parliament, Local Authorities, Crown Entities, and 
Departments of Public Service as defined in the relevant pieces of legislation governing those bodies. 
144 Public Audit Act 2001, sl6 
145 See: Ombudsmen Act 197 5, ss 13 and 22. 
146 See: Clerk of the Hou e of Representatives Act 1988, s2 
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to the House and its committees in relation to parliamentary law and procedure. 147 It 
also examines and may assist in the preparation of papers, motions, petitions, B.ills 
and questions and makes sure that they are presented to the House in accordance with 
the Standing Orders and Speakers rulings. The Clerk's Office's duties also include the 
overseeing of the opening of Parliament and relations with other Parliaments. 148 
The United Kingdom Speaker 's Counsel 
This Officer of the House is peculiar to the United Kingdom Parliament. The 
Speaker of the House appoints the Speaker's Counsel. Currently Speaker's Counsel 
consists of two posts, Counsel for Legislation and Counsel for European Legislation. 
There are also two Assistant Counsels. The Speaker's Counsel and the Assistant 
Counsel form the Legal Services Office in the Department of the Clerk of the 
House.
149 
Their function includes advising Joint and Select Committees on Statutory 
Instruments . He or she also has the general duty of advising the Speaker and Officers 
of the House on legal matters arising out of public business or affairs of the House.150 
In general terms, an entity akin to an Officer of Parliament or the House 
appears an appropriate alternative scrutineer body. This is because such an entity is an 
integral part of the Parliamentary system, yet it is not tainted by partisanship. The 
types of function (such as auditing and advising Government and the public sector) 
these bodies carry out are generally consonant with those that an effective scrutineer 
body would carry out. The appointment procedures pertaining to many Officers also 
appear to be an appropriate model. Appointment by the Governor-General on advice 
of a Minister or by the Speaker maintains some semblance of non-partisanship. 
Officers of the House and Parliament as well as being acceptable to Parliamentarians, 
engender respect in the wider community. For example the Office of the Ombudsman 
has enjoyed a good reputation amongst the public since its inception. Finally, there is 
an ideal model for a scrutineer entity in the form of the UK Speaker' s Counsel. This is 
147 
See: <http//: www.dcrk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 30 July 2004) 
148 PA Joseph, above nl2 , 376 
149 
Liz Carless, House of Commons Information Office, "HCINFO @parliament.uk" , House of 
Commons, London, to the author (3 August 2004) email. 
150 
See:Halsb11ry 's Laws of England PARLIAMENT 3. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, (4) 
CONDUCT OF BUSINESS, (iv) Permanent Officers, 651 . Speaker 's Counse l, Comptroller and 
Auditor-General and Parliamentary Commissioner for Aclmini stration <http//: 
www.buuerwonhsonline.com> (last accessed 29 July 200-l-) 
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an office that provides legal advice to the House on a wide range of matters. It is 
posited that a body such as this, with no membership of the Government but a duty to 
provide legal opinions to the House, could potentially cure the inherent flaws in 
section seven identified by this paper whilst still be acceptable to Parliamentarians 
and the wider public. 
VII PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
It is argued that an Officer of Parliament perhaps known as Counsel for Bill of 
Rights Compliance should be established. Such an entity would comprise a Senior 
Counsel and several Assistant Counsel. It is envisaged that the primary duties of such 
an office would be as follows; 
i) To bring to the attention of the House any provision of any Bill which 
appears inconsistent with any right or freedom contained in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act; 
ii) Where any provision in any Bill appears to be inconsistent with any 
right or freedom contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, the Counsel for Bill of Rights Compliance must present a paper 
for publication by order of the House, in relation to the relevant 
inconsistency. In the case of a Government Bill the paper must be 
presented to the House before the motion for the first reading of the 
Bill is made. In the case of any other Bill Counsel for Bill of Rights 
Compliance must present the paper to the House as soon as practicable. 
iii) Where any amendment is proposed to a Bill progressing through the 
House the Amendment must first be scrutinised by Counsel for Bill of 
Rights Compliance. Where any provision of a proposed amendment 
appears inconsistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the Counsel for Bill of Rights Compliance 
must present a paper for publication to the House before the proposed 
amendment is voted on by the House. ( It is acknowledged that there 
may be some practical difficulties in implementing this provision. A 
timeframe for this process may be appropriate to prevent the legislative 
process stalling). 
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iv) To advise the House and its Committees on request in relation to any 
matter relating to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 or any 
human rights issues relating to any domestic legislation or international 
instrument, which New Zealand has ratified. 
The Counsel's office would be comprised of qualified legal counsel preferably 
with significant experience in Bill of Rights and/or human rights law. It is envisaged 
that the Governor-General on the advice of the Minister of Justice would appoint the 
Senior Counsel. Assistant Counsel could then be appointed as needed by the Senior 
Counsel. A fixed term longer than any term of Government (for example seven years) 
might be appropriate to strengthen the appearance of non-partisanship. 
The opinion of the Counsel would be a definitive legal opinion presented to 
the House for publication and as such it would be a matter of public record. As there 
would be no second layer of legal advisors (as there are under the current system) 
confusion and concerns about transparency related to the website and behind the 
scenes dealing with Departments would be avoided. 
Further, those who hold tight to the ideal of Parliamentary Sovereignty could 
find comfort in the fact that such a body was still an integral part of the Parliamentary 
system. A part, however, that maintained the semblance of non-partisanship. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Recent history has witnessed growing tensions between the Government and 
Bench and a loss of public confidence in the system. Some of the rhetoric associated 
with this has centred on New Zealand's experience with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. This coupled with the importance of the Act as an integral part of 
New Zealand's ongoing commitment to international human rights norms, provides 
the impetus for detailed examination of the Act. 
This paper has examined one important section in the Act's framework by 
applying a policy analysis analogous to Natural Justice or Fairness principles. It is 
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vital that every part of an Act which espouses human rights principles accords with 
accepted ideals of fairness and justice. 
Application of the analysis has highlighted that there are serious flaws in the 
section seven process. These flaws revolve around transparency and apparent bias 
issues. The practical consequences of these flaws may be significant. The real risk of 
erosion of public faith in a system already viewed with some scepticism by sectors of 
the public emerges. Moreover, the potential exists for undermining of the appearance 
of impartiality of the office of Attorney-General. The aura of impartiality has always 
been constitutionally crucial to the role of Attorney-General in this country. 
The emergent flaws and potential consequences of these flaws require that 
consideration be given to the reform of section seven. After canvassing the possible 
alternatives it appears that the most feasible starting point is the creation of a quasi-
independent counsel to advise the House on Bill of Rights compliance issues. 
It is acknowledged that the reform of section seven would be a formidable 
task. However, the difficulties inherent in the section and the potential consequences 
of this, in conjunction with the significance of the Act and its place in the imagination 
of New Zealanders, demands that the reform issue be considered. 
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